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Summary: Safety and securing systems for level crossing have a long life time. Once 
a system reaches a life time when it is no longer conform to applicable regulations, it 
has to be modernized or replaced. The planner of the level crossing system alongside 
the road and railroad has to adapt the system to various local conditions and rules. 
He has to choose a suitable system by the use of his individual expert knowledge. 
The decisions he made are often hard to understand or to trace for the operating 
company. This paper presents a structured method, which was developed as a basis 
for the decision making. It helps to trace the decisions of the engineer and even 
enables the engineer to identify a suitable level crossing system. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Current prospects say that the traffic performance in the year 2025 will 
be much higher than today. Compared to the year 2004 the passenger rail 
transport will increase by 25.6 % and the freight rail transport will increase 
by 34 % [1]. The future transport demand causes a high pressure on railway 
companies to provide an efficient service, which requires also a capable 
railway infrastructure.  
The Institute of Transportation Systems (ITS) of the German Aerospace 
Center (DLR), in cooperation with the German infrastructure operator DB 
Netz AG, has analysed the planning procedure of level crossings. The main 
question was how to determine the optimal technical equipment in the early 
planning phase to ensure an efficient railway operation. The result of this 
analysis is a method for a structured identification of suitable safety systems 
for level crossings. 
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2. Safety Systems for Level Crossing 
Level crossings in Germany are basically divided into those which are 
technically secured and those which are not technically secured. The 
German body of rules and regulations for railway construction and 
operation (EBO) defines when a technically secured level crossing is 
required [2]. Therein the minimal criteria for a technical securing system of 
the level crossing are determined depending on the conditions alongside the 
road and the railway (see Fig.1).  
 
Fig.1. Criteria for securing Level Crossings according to the EBO [3] 
The technical securing of level crossings is a task involving various 
means of transport and thus a complex manner for all involved 
organisations (authorities and companies). The common goal is to install the 
most efficient technologies in terms of economy and operation. Thereby it 
has to be distinguished between the safety system alongside the railroad and 
the securing system alongside the road. Both systems have to be planned by 
an engineer (planner). While the system alongside the road is strictly bound 
to the directive KoRil 815 with little scope for interpretation, the system 
alongside the railroad is open to choose different technical equipment. 
Hence it is much more difficult to determine a suitable system. The study 
focuses on a method to identify the suitable safety system alongside the 
railroad. 
The current state of activation of the level crossings in Germany is 
mainly characterised by three main types of level crossing control systems 
[4]: 
− Signal controlled (Interlock through a main signal) (Hp): Activating 
level crossing through interlocking system. To set signals level 
crossing must be safe.  
− Control through signaller (Fü): Activating level crossing through train 
by trackside elements. Control of the status of level crossing at 
interlocking system through signaller.  
− Control through train driver (ÜS): Activating level crossing through 
train by trackside elements. Control status of level crossing at 
surveillance signal by train driver.  
If a level crossing is rebuilt or a new level crossing safety system is 
used, the elementary control systems for level crossings are completed 
through combinations of the three basic control systems. All in all it is 
possible to install the following six control systems [5]: 
− ÜS, Hp, Fü and 
− Control by train driver by optimized activation (ÜSOE): The idea is to 
combine an ÜS (surveillance signal) with the Fü-logic (optimized 
activation point).  
− Combination of the basic control systems: Hp/ÜS, Hp/Fü 
During the planning procedure of the particular level crossings, it is 
identified and determined which control system is used and when it is used. 
 
 
3. Practice in Planning Level Crossings Today 
The realisation of level crossing projects, as it is practiced today, has the 
following steps (see also Fig. 2): 
− Identifying the need (e.g. judicial reasons, building measures at the 
road or at the rail track) 
− Determining if an existing technical securing system has to be revised 
or a new technical securing system has to be installed 
− Planning by experience of the designer or consulting 
− Clearing of the financing 
− Planning of the system alongside the road 
− Planning of the system alongside the railroad 
− Building  
As mentioned above, the system alongside the road is simple to choose 
and to plan, because the corresponding directive is comparatively straight. 
The difficulty lies within the identification of a suitable system alongside 
the railroad. The decision depends on or is at least influenced by various 
given parameters. Some of those parameters, mainly judicial and technical 
ones, exclude or require a certain system, while others only point to a 
preferred system. The designing engineer has also to consider the 
interdependencies between some of the parameters. Thus, the engineer often 
finds himself in a situation when he has to decide between optional systems 
which all fit the requirements but differ in their operational efficiency. 
 
Fig.2. Today’s practice in planning level crossings 
The engineer’s decision is based on his individual expert knowledge, 
which makes it hard to understand for other involved instances, e.g. the 
operating company. Additionally, the lack of a structured method which 
allows for all relevant criteria in the decision leads to results strongly 
depending on the individual planner. Thus, it is not guaranteed that the 
chosen system is the technically and operationally best solution. 
 
 
4. The Structured Approach 
A method for a structured identification of suitable safety systems for 
level crossings, not only enables others to understand the decision process, 
but also helps the planning engineer to consider all relevant criteria. The 
decision per criteria can be successively processed and documented (see 
Fig. 3). It also fasten the process, hence saves money. 
 
Fig.3. Adapted process with the new structured approach 
It is essential to completely cover all parameters and their 
interdependencies, so that certain systems can be removed from the set of 
solutions. Three types of parameters have been identified: 
− Non-influenceable basic parameters: These are mainly operational or 
judicial or technical conditions, which result from the circumstances of 
the surroundings of the regarding level crossing, e.g. immediate 
vicinity of main traffic road, interface to a corresponding interlocking, 
etc. 
− Influenceable basic parameters: These are technical or operational 
parameters with different options. The designing engineer has to 
decide which option is needed or wanted for the regarding level 
crossing, e.g. including of the level crossing in the regional operation 
control centre, autonomously operating level crossing, etc.  
− Depending parameters: These are parameters that always depend on 
basic parameters. They may also influence each other, e.g. the closing 
time as little as possible. 
Some of the parameters of each type exclude or require a certain safety and 
securing system. These are so called exclusive parameters. 
The structured approach lists all parameters and their options (currently 
20 parameters with the total amount of 48 options) in a way that the 
designing engineer only has to select the option where applicable. As 
mentioned before, selecting an option of a parameter will eliminate or at 
least favours one or more systems from the set of solutions.  This is realised 
with a score value expressing the benefit of the corresponding securing 
system. The integer score ranges from 0 to 2, with: 
− 0 meaning the system is inapplicable hence has to be excluded,  
− 1 the system is applicable, 
− 2 the system is favourable regarding the option 
 
Fig.4. Section of structured identification 
Figure 4 shows a section of the structured identification approach. 
Therein the designing engineer has to set “1” or “0” in the column 
“Selection”. A “0” marks an incorrect option, whereas “1” marks a correct 
option of the parameter in the corresponding line. It also prohibits another 
entry of “1” for the same parameter. The use of numbers is part of the 
method, because it enables the mathematical calculation of decisions 
regarding a single parameter and the overall decision. The columns and 
lines of “System I” contain the information on the score value xi of 
a system. For all safety and securing systems i applies: 
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with  and { }1;0∈s Nn∈ as the set of all parameters and nMm∈ as the set 
of all options of parameter n. Once the engineer has checked off and marked 
the options the result is shown in the last line. The field with the highest 
value indicates the most suitable system regarding the conditions and 
choices. A field containing a Zero means this system is not applicable in 
this situation.  
The description above is first part of the method. It supports a structured 
quantification of the most suitable system, but does not automatically make 
the process easier or prevents faults. This is achieved with the second part 
of the method which takes into account the interdependencies between the 
parameters and their options. Therefore, all options of a parameter are 
associated with each other via a matrix structure, similar to the principles of 
an adjacency matrix. The matrix contains the status of an association, so 
that it documents which influence a certain option has on other options. For 
example, a parameter A is “YES” which requires parameter B with “No”. 
The matrix forces the engineer to follow conditions or prohibits conflicting 
options. Thus, it prevents faults. Additionally, the matrix tells which 
parameter(s) should be checked off next after a parameter has been checked 
off. It is a kind of guiding the engineer through the decision process and 
avoiding unnecessary parameters. It works like a decision tree but it is more 
flexible. Another advantage of the method is that the deciding person does 
not necessarily have to start with the first parameter listed. It is possible to 
start checking any favourable parameter and still get the result quickly. 
 
 
5. Example 
The previous chapter explained the method. An example of its 
application is given in this chapter. Entering the planning process where the 
adaptation of the safety system starts (see Fig. 3). The planner takes the list 
of parameters and compares the options with the circumstances and 
condition of his level crossing project. He can start with whichever 
parameter he prefers, but it is recommended and reasonable to start with one 
of the non-influenceable parameters. In this example (see Fig. 5) he starts 
with parameter number 3. The level crossing is integrated in the 
interlocking hence he marks option “Yes” with “1”. The result is that the 
systems ÜS and ÜSOE are excluded, because they are not applicable here. In 
conformity with the documented dependency of options (not shown in the 
figure due to the complexity of the matrix), the checked option requires 
parameters number 1 and 2 both to be checked with “Yes” too. Otherwise 
there would emerge a conflict. 
 
Fig.5. Section of an example of the method 
Additionally, the matrix guides the engineer to other parameters. In this 
example he wants the system to be included in the regional control centre 
and it shall not operate autonomously, thus he checks parameter 13 with 
“Yes” and 14 with “No”. The decision eliminates the systems Fü and HP/Fü 
from the set of solutions. If the engineer would have chosen number 14 with 
“Yes” no system would be left and he must have revised his choice. 
At this point the engineer can read from the result line that only systems 
Hp/ÜS and Hp are suitable, with Hp favoured. The engineer might be 
satisfied with the result or check off some more parameters (may be number 
20) until the result is only a single system. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper explains a method for a structured identification of suitable 
safety and securing systems for level crossings. The method starts with the 
listing of all relevant environmental, technical, operational, and judicial 
parameters and their options regarding the decision for operationally and 
technically efficient system. It reflects the current technical standards and 
the German body of rules and regulations. The parameters had been sorted 
into three types of parameters (non-influenceable, influenceable, and 
depending). For each option of every parameter the effect on a system had 
been defined pointing out whether a system is favourable or just suitable or 
inapplicable. The associations between parameters had also been taken into 
account via a matrix structure. It provided a guide through the decision 
process. The planning engineer simply has to check off the parameter‘s 
options applying his knowledge.  
The advantages of this approach are summarised as follows: 
− Decisions are less individual 
− Decisions are understandable respectively traceable  
− Makes it easier for the engineer to consider all relevant criteria 
− Prevents from faults 
− Identifies the technically and operationally efficient system 
− Saves time and money 
Although, the presented method is supporting the design and planning 
process it can be improved. The goal is an integrated method which not only 
considers the systems alongside the railroad but also the systems alongside 
the road. Additionally, the identification of the operationally and 
economically efficient system is an import goal. This is done in another 
study and will be published in the near future. 
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